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Abstract
We propose a setting for two-phase opinion dynamics in social networks, where
a node’s final opinion in the first phase acts as its initial biased opinion in the
second phase. In this setting, we study the problem of two camps aiming to max-
imize adoption of their respective opinions, by strategically investing on nodes
in the two phases. A node’s initial opinion in the second phase naturally plays
a key role in determining the final opinion of that node, and hence also of other
nodes in the network due to its influence on them. However, more importantly,
this bias also determines the effectiveness of a camp’s investment on that node
in the second phase. In order to formalize this two-phase investment setting, we
propose an extension of Friedkin-Johnsen model, and hence formulate the utility
functions of the camps. We arrive at a decision parameter which can be inter-
preted as two-phase Katz centrality. There is a natural tradeoff while splitting
the available budget between the two phases. A lower investment in the first
phase results in worse initial biases in the network for the second phase. On the
other hand, a higher investment in the first phase spares a lower available bud-
get for the second phase, resulting in an inability to fully harness the influenced
biases. We first analyze the non-competitive case where only one camp invests,
IA previous, preliminary, concise version of this paper was presented at The Joint Inter-
national Workshop on Social Influence Analysis and Mining Actionable Insights from Social
Networks (workshop with IJCAI-ECAI), Stockholm, Sweden, 2018 [1].
∗This is to indicate the corresponding author.
Email address: swapnil.dhamal@gmail.com (Swapnil Dhamal)
1Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, Sophia Antipolis-
Me´diterrane´e, Valbonne 06902, France
2Te´le´com SudParis, CNRS, Evry 91011, France
3Laboratoire Informatique d’Avignon, Avignon 84140, France
Preprint submitted to Journal of Information Processing and Management June 26, 2019
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
08
29
1v
2 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 24
 Ju
n 2
01
9
for which we present a polynomial time algorithm for determining an optimal
way to split the camp’s budget between the two phases. We then analyze the
case of competing camps, where we show the existence of Nash equilibrium and
that it can be computed in polynomial time under reasonable assumptions. We
conclude our study with simulations on real-world network datasets, in order to
quantify the effects of the initial biases and the weightage attributed by nodes
to their initial biases, as well as that of a camp deviating from its equilibrium
strategy. Our main conclusion is that, if nodes attribute high weightage to their
initial biases, it is advantageous to have a high investment in the first phase, so
as to effectively influence the biases to be harnessed in the second phase.
Keywords: Social networks, opinion dynamics, two phases, zero-sum games,
Nash equilibrium, Katz centrality
1. Introduction
Studying opinion dynamics in a society is important to understand and
influence elections, viral marketing, propagation of ideas and behaviors, etc.
Social networks play a prime role in determining the opinions of constituent
nodes, since nodes usually update their opinions based on the opinions of their
connections [2, 3]. This fact is exploited by camps, intending to influence the
opinions of these nodes in their favor. A camp could be, for instance, seeker of
funds or votes for a particular cause. In this paper, we consider two camps who
aim to maximize the adoption of their respective opinions in a social network.
We consider a strict competition in the space of real-valued opinions, where one
camp aims to drive the overall opinion of the network towards being positive
while the other camp aims to drive it towards negative; we refer to them as good
and bad camps respectively. (The terminologies ‘good’ and ‘bad’ camps are used
only for the ease of interpretation that one camp holds a positive opinion while
the other camp holds a negative opinion on the real number line; it does not
necessarily imply that one camp is more virtuous than the other.) We consider
a well-accepted quantification of the overall opinion of a network: the average
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or equivalently, the sum of opinion values of the nodes in the social network
[4, 5, 6]. Hence, the good and bad camps simultaneously aim to maximize and
minimize this sum, respectively.
The average or sum of opinion values is well suited to several applications.
For instance, in a fund collection scenario, the magnitude of the opinion value of
a node can be interpreted as the amount of funds it is willing to contribute, and
its sign would imply the camp towards which it is willing to contribute. Here,
the objective of the good camp would be to drive the sum of opinion values
of the nodes to be as high as possible, so as to gather maximum funds for its
concerned cause. On the other hand, the objective of the bad camp would be
to drive this sum to be as low as possible, that is, to convince the population to
contribute for an opposing cause. In such scenarios, the opinion value of a node
would be a real-valued number, and the overall opinion of the network is well
indicated by the sum or average of the opinion values of its constituent nodes.
While fund collection is a particular scenario where a node’s opinion is explicitly
expressed in the form of its contribution, the underlying principle, in general,
applies to scenarios that involve nodes having certain belief or information.
In the literature on opinion dynamics in social networks, there have been
efforts to develop models which could determine how the individuals update
their opinions based on the opinions of their connections [3]. With such an
underlying model of opinion dynamics, we consider that each camp aims to
maximize the adoption of its opinion in the social network, while accounting
for the presence of the competing camp. A camp could hence act on achieving
its objective by strategically investing on selected influential individuals in a
social network who could adopt its opinion. This investment could be in the
form of money, free products or discounts, attention, convincing discussions,
etc. Thus given a budget constraint, the strategy of a camp comprises how
much to invest on each node, in the presence of a competing camp who also
invests strategically. This results in a game, and we are essentially interested
in determining the equilibrium strategies of the two camps, from which neither
camp would want to unilaterally deviate. Hence, our focus in this paper will be
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on determining the Nash equilibrium of this game.
1.1. Motivation
In the popular model by Friedkin and Johnsen [7, 8] (which we will describe
later), every node holds an initial bias in opinion. It could have formed owing
to the node’s fundamental views, experiences, information from news and other
sources, opinion dynamics in the past, etc. This initial bias plays an important
role in determining a node’s final opinion, and consequently the opinions of
its neighbors and hence that of its neighbors’ neighbors and so on. If nodes
give significant weightage to their biases, the camps would want to manipulate
these biases. This could be achieved by campaigning in two phases, wherein
the opinion at the conclusion of the first phase would act as the initial biased
opinion for the second phase. Such campaigning is often used during elections
and marketing, in order to gradually drive the nodes’ opinions.
In real-world scenarios, the initial bias of a node often impacts a camp’s
effectiveness on that node. For instance, if the initial bias of a node is positive,
the investment made by the good camp is likely to be more effective on it than
that made by the bad camp. The reasoning is on similar lines as that of models
in which a node pays more attention to opinions that do not differ too much
from its own opinion (such as the bounded confidence model [9]). Since a camp’s
effectiveness depends on the nodes’ biases, its investment in the first phase not
only manipulates the biases for getting a head start in the second phase, but
also the effectiveness of its investment in the second phase.
Furthermore, with the possibility of campaigning in two phases, a camp
could not only decide which nodes to invest on, but also how to split its available
budget between the two phases.
1.2. Related Work
Opinion dynamics in social networks. The topic of opinion dynamics has re-
ceived significant attention in the social networks community. Xia, Wang, and
Xuan [10] give a multidisciplinary review of the field of opinion dynamics as a
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combination of the social processes and the analytical and computational tools.
A line of work deals with opinion diffusion in social networks under popular mod-
els such as the independent cascade and linear threshold [2, 11, 12]. Another
line of work addresses continuous-time diffusion models [13], and specifically
point process models for diffusion [14]. Lorenz [15] surveys several modeling
frameworks concerning continuous opinion dynamics. Rodriguez and Song [16]
present several diffusion models and address problems such as network estima-
tion, influence estimation, and influence control, using methods from machine
learning, probabilistic modeling, event history analysis, graph theory, and net-
work science.
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [3] review several fundamental models of opinion dy-
namics, some noteworthy ones being DeGroot [17], Voter [18], Friedkin-Johnsen
[7, 8], bounded confidence [9], etc. In Friedkin-Johnsen model, each node up-
dates its opinion using a weighted combination of its initial bias and its neigh-
bors’ opinions. In this paper, we generalize this model to multiple phases, while
also incorporating the camps’ investments.
Identifying influential nodes. Problems related to determining influential nodes
for maximizing opinion adoption in social networks have been extensively stud-
ied in the literature [2, 12]. For instance, Yildiz, Ozdaglar, and Acemoglu [19]
study the problem of optimal placement of stubborn nodes (whose opinion val-
ues stay unchanged) in the discrete binary opinions setting. Gionis, Terzi, and
Tsaparas [4] study the problem of identifying such nodes whose positive opinions
would maximize the overall positive opinion in the network. Kempe, Kleinberg,
and Tardos [11] propose approximation algorithms for identifying influential
nodes under the independent cascade and linear threshold models, which has
since been followed by a plethora of increasingly efficient techniques [12].
Lynn and Lee [20] study influence maximization in the context of the Ising
model, by treating individual opinions as spins in an Ising system at dynamic
equilibrium; hence the goal is to maximize the magnetization of an Ising system
given a budget of external magnetic field. Rossi and Ahmed [21] study tech-
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niques for discovering roles in networks by proposing a general formulation of
roles of nodes based on the similarity of feature representation (in contrast to
only the graph representation as traditionally considered). Abiteboul, Preda,
and Cobena [22] develop an on-line algorithm for computing the importance of
a node, which adapts dynamically to the changes in the network. Grindrod et
al. [23] propose a way of extending classical node centrality measures from the
literature on static networks, to be applied to evolving networks. Gleich and
Rossi [24] propose a dynamical system that captures changes to the centrality of
nodes as external interest in those nodes vary, thus resulting in a time-dependent
set of centrality scores.
The competitive setting has resulted in a number of game theoretic studies
[25, 26, 27]. Bharathi, Kempe, and Salek [28] were among the first to study
opinion adoption in social networks from a game theoretic viewpoint. Goyal,
Heidari, and Kearns [29] present a model for the diffusion of two competing opin-
ions in a social network, in which nodes first choose whether to adopt either of
the opinions or none of them, and then choose which opinion to adopt. Anag-
nostopoulos, Ferraioli, and Leonardi [30] study this model in detail for some
of the well-known dynamics. Ghaderi and Srikant [31] study how the equilib-
rium of the game depends on the network structure, nodes’ initial opinions, the
location of stubborn nodes and the extent of their stubbornness.
Specific to analytically tractable models such as DeGroot, there have been
studies in the competitive setting to identify influential nodes and the amounts
to be invested on them [5, 32, 33]. Dhamal et al. [6] study a broader framework
with respect to one such model (Friedkin-Johnsen model), while considering a
number of practically motivated settings such as those accounting for dimin-
ishing marginal returns on investment, adversarial behavior of the competitor,
uncertainty regarding system parameters, and bound on the combined invest-
ment by the camps on each node. Our work extends these studies to two phases,
by identifying influential nodes in the two phases and how much they should be
invested on in each phase.
6
Multi-phase opinion diffusion. There have been a few studies on adaptive se-
lection of influential nodes for opinion diffusion in multiple phases. Singer [34]
presents a survey of such adaptive methodologies. Golovin and Krause [35]
introduce adaptive submodularity, which facilitates adaptive greedy algorithm
to provide a performance guarantee. Seeman and Singer [36] were among the
first to dedicatedly study the framework of adaptive node selection. Rubinstein,
Seeman, and Singer [37] present adaptive algorithms for selecting nodes with
heterogeneous costs. Horel and Singer [38] develop scalable methods for models
in which the influence of a set can be expressed as the sum of influence of its
members. Correa et al. [39] show that the adaptivity benefit is bounded if every
pair of nodes randomly meet at the same rate. Badanidiyuru et al. [40] propose
an algorithm based on locally-adaptive policies.
Dhamal, Prabuchandran, and Narahari [41] empirically study the problem of
optimally splitting the available budget between two phases under the popular
independent cascade model, which has been extended to more than two phases
in [42]. Tong et al. [43] study adaptive node selection in a dynamic independent
cascade model. Yuan and Tang [44] present a framework where nodes can be
selected before termination of an ongoing diffusion. Sun et al. [45] study the
problem of multi-round influence maximization, where the goal is to select nodes
for each round to maximize the expected number of nodes that are influenced in
at least one round. Mondal, Dhamal, and Narahari [46] study a setting where
the first phase is regular diffusion, while the second phase is boosted using
referral incentives.
While the reasoning behind using multiple phases in these studies is adap-
tation of node selection strategy based on previous observations, we aim to use
multiple phases for manipulating the initial biases of nodes. This requires a very
different conceptual and analytical treatment from the ones in the literature.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been an analytical study on a
rich model such as Friedkin-Johnsen, for opinion dynamics in two phases (not
even for single camp). The most relevant to this study is our earlier work [47]
where, however, a camp’s influence on a node is assumed to be independent of
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the node’s bias. In this paper, we consider a more realistic setting by relaxing
this assumption. An interesting outcome of relaxing this assumption is that,
while the camps’ optimal strategies turn out to be mutually independent in
[47], these strategies get coupled in our setting. In other words, the setting in
[47] results in a competition, while the one in this paper results in a game.
1.3. Our Contributions
Following are the specific contributions of this paper:
• We formulate the two-phase objective function under Friedkin-Johnsen
model, where a node’s final opinion in the first phase acts as its initial
bias for the second phase, and the effectiveness of a camp’s investment on
the node depends on this initial bias. (Section 2)
• For the non-competitive case, we develop a polynomial time algorithm for
determining an optimal way to split a camp’s budget between the two
phases and the nodes to be invested on in the two phases. (Section 3)
• For the competitive case involving both the camps, we show the existence
of Nash equilibrium, and that it can be computed in polynomial time
under reasonable assumptions. (Section 4)
• Using simulations, we illustrate our analytically derived results on real-
world network datasets, and quantify the effects of the initial biases and
the weightage attributed by nodes to their initial biases, as well as that of
a camp deviating from its equilibrium strategy. (Section 5)
2. Our Model
Given a social network, let V be the set of nodes, n be the number of nodes
(cardinality of V ), and E be the set of weighted directed edges. Our model can
be viewed as a multiphase extension of [6], and more broadly, an extension of
Friedkin-Johnsen model [7, 8].
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2.1. Friedkin-Johnsen Model
In Friedkin-Johnsen model, prior to the process of opinion dynamics, each
node holds a certain bias in its opinion. We denote this opinion bias of a node
i by z0i , and the weightage that the node attributes to it by w
0
ii.
The network effect is captured by how much a node is influenced by each of
its friends or connections, that is, how much weightage is attributed by a node
to the opinion of each of its connections. Let zj be the opinion held by node j,
and wij be the weightage attributed by node i to the opinion of node j. The
influence on node i owing to node j is given by wijzj , thus the net influence
on i owing to all of its connections is
∑
j∈V wijzj (where wij 6= 0 only if j is
a connection of i). The directed nature of the edges accounts for the fact that
the weightage attributed by node i to the opinion of node j would, in general,
be different from the weightage attributed by node j to the opinion of node
i. Furthermore, undirected edges are a special case of directed edges, where
wij = wji. Note that the edge weights could be negative as well (as justified in
[48, 49]). A negative edge weight wij can be interpreted as distrust that node i
holds on node j, that is, i would be driven towards adopting an opinion that is
opposite to that held or suggested by j.
Since in Friedkin-Johnsen model, each node updates its opinion using a
weighted convex combination of its bias and its neighbors’ opinions, the update
rule is given by
∀i ∈ V : zi ← w0iiz0i +
∑
j∈V
wijzj
We can also write this update rule as a recursion (with iterating integer τ ≥ 0):
∀i ∈ V : zi 〈τ〉 = w0iiz0i +
∑
j∈V
wijzj 〈τ−1〉 , wherezi 〈0〉 = z
0
i
Since the model follows an opinion update rule, convergence is often a
desirable property. A standard assumption for guaranteeing convergence is∑
j∈V |wij | < 1. We will later see how we use this condition in our analysis.
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2.2. Our Extended Model
As our opinion dynamics runs in two phases, most parameters have two val-
ues, one for each phase. For such a parameter, we denote its value corresponding
to phase p using superscript (p), where p = 1 for the first phase and p = 2 for
the second phase. For instance, we denote the parameter corresponding to the
opinion value of node i after phase p by z
(p)
i . Table 1 presents the notation.
Initial Bias. Consistent with Friedkin-Johnsen model, every node i holds an
initial bias in opinion z0i ∈ R prior to the opinion dynamics process, and at-
tributes a weightage of w0ii to it. In the two-phase setting, z
0
i acts as the initial
bias for the first phase. We denote the opinion value of node i at the conclusion
of the first phase by z
(1)
i . This acts as its initial bias for the second phase. So
by convention, we have z
(0)
i = z
0
i . In the context of the fund collection example,
z0i is the initial bias of node i based on its perception of the causes for which
the funds are being collected by the camps. For instance, a very positive z0i
would mean that, prior to campaigning and opinion dynamics process, node i
is aligned towards contributing significantly to the funds pertaining to the good
camp’s cause.
Network Effect. Consistent with Friedkin-Johnsen model, we consider that the
influence on node i owing to node j in phase p, is wijz
(p)
j , where wij is the
weightage attributed by node i to the opinion of its connection j. In the fund
collection example, the influence on node i owing to its connection j is the
product of node j’s opinion regarding how much and which cause to contribute
to, and the weightage attributed by node i to node j’s opinion based on the level
of trust and confidence that node i has on node j’s opinion. The net influence
on node i owing to all of its connections is, hence,
∑
j∈V wijz
(p)
j .
Weightage to Campaigning. We denote the weightage that node i attributes to
the good and bad campaigning in phase p by w
(p)
ig and w
(p)
ib , respectively. Since
we consider that the initial bias of a node impacts the effectiveness of camps’
investments, z
(p−1)
i > 0 would likely result in w
(p)
ig > w
(p)
ib . Note that w
0
ii would
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Table 1: Notation table
z0i initial biased opinion of node i
w0ii weightage attributed by node i to its initial bias
wij weightage attributed by node i to the opinion of node j
θi total weightage attributed by node i to the camps’ opinions
w
(p)
ig weightage attributed by node i to the good camp in phase p
w
(p)
ib weightage attributed by node i to the bad camp in phase p
x
(p)
i investment made by the good camp to directly influence node i in phase p
y
(p)
i investment made by the bad camp to directly influence node i in phase p
kg total budget of the good camp
kb total budget of the bad camp
z
(p)
i opinion of node i at the end of phase p
also play a role since it quantifies the weightage given by node i to its initial
bias. We hence propose a model on this line, wherein w
(p)
ig is a monotone non-
decreasing function of w0iiz
(p−1)
i , and w
(p)
ib is a monotone non-increasing function
of w0iiz
(p−1)
i . Let node i attribute a total of θi to the influence weights of the
camps, that is, w
(p)
ig + w
(p)
ib = θi. We propose the following natural model:
w
(p)
ig = θi
(
1 + w0iiz
(p−1)
i
2
)
, w
(p)
ib = θi
(
1− w0iiz(p−1)i
2
)
(1)
So in the fund collection example, if in a phase, node i’s bias is very positive
(which means that it is already aligned towards contributing significantly so as
to help the good camp’s cause), it would be easier for the good camp to influence
node i than it would be for the competing camp.
Camp Investments. The good and bad camps attempt to directly influence the
nodes so that their opinions are driven towards being positive and negative,
respectively. We denote the investments made by the good and bad camps on
node i in phase p by x
(p)
i and y
(p)
i respectively (x
(p)
i , y
(p)
i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ V for p = 1, 2).
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In the fund collection example, the investments by a camp on a node could be
in the form of effort and time spent in presenting convincing arguments in favor
of the cause supported by the camp. Since the influence of good camp (positive
opinion) on node i in phase p would be an increasing function of both x
(p)
i
and w
(p)
ig , we assume the influence to be +w
(p)
ig x
(p)
i (maintaining the linearity
of Friedkin-Johnsen model). Similarly, −w(p)ib y(p)i is the influence of bad camp
(negative opinion) on node i in phase p. Let kg and kb be the respective budgets
of the good and bad camps. Hence the camps should invest in the two phases
such that
∑
i∈V (x
(1)
i + x
(2)
i ) ≤ kg and
∑
i∈V (y
(1)
i + y
(2)
i ) ≤ kb.
Matrix Forms. Let W be the matrix consisting of weights wij for each pair
of nodes (i, j). Let z0, w0, Θ, wg
(p), wb
(p), x(p), y(p), z(p) be the vectors
consisting of elements z0i , w
0
ii, θi, w
(p)
ig , w
(p)
ib , x
(p)
i , y
(p)
i , z
(p)
i , respectively. Let
operation ◦ denote Hadamard vector product, that is, (e ◦ f)i = eifi.
Opinion Update Rule. Recall that the update rule in Friedkin-Johnsen model
is given by
∀i ∈ V : zi ← w0iiz0i +
∑
j∈V
wijzj
Extending to multiple phases, the update rule in the pth phase is
∀i ∈ V : z(p)i ← w0iiz(p−1)i +
∑
j∈V
wijz
(p)
j
Accounting for camps’ investments, we get
∀i ∈ V : z(p)i ← w0iiz(p−1)i +
∑
j∈V
wijz
(p)
j + w
(p)
ig x
(p)
i − w(p)ib y(p)i
⇐⇒ z(p) ← w0 ◦ z(p−1) +Wz(p) +wg(p) ◦ x(p) −wb(p) ◦ y(p) (2)
In phase p, the vectors x(p),y(p), z(p−1) stay unchanged; the weightswg(p),wb(p)
(which depend on z(p−1)) and w0 also stay unchanged; while z(p) gets updated.
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Hence, writing the update rule as recursion (with iterating integer τ ≥ 0), we
get
z
(p)
〈τ〉 = Wz
(p)
〈τ−1〉 +w
0 ◦ z(p−1) +wg(p) ◦ x(p) −wb(p) ◦ y(p)
Solving the recursion simplifies it to
z
(p)
〈τ〉 = W
τz
(p)
〈0〉 +
( τ−1∑
η=0
Wη
)
(w0 ◦ z(p−1) +wg(p) ◦ x(p) −wb(p) ◦ y(p))
Now, the initial bias for phase p : z
(p)
〈0〉 = z
(p−1). Also, since
∑
j∈V |wij | < 1,
we have that W is a strictly substochastic matrix (sum of each row strictly less
than 1). Hence its spectral radius is less than 1. So when τ → ∞, we have
limτ→∞Wτ = 0 and limτ→∞
∑τ−1
η=0 W
η = (I−W)−1 [5]. Hence,
lim
τ→∞
z
(p)
〈τ〉 = (I−W)−1(w0 ◦ z(p−1) +wg(p) ◦ x(p) −wb(p) ◦ y(p))
which is a constant vector. So the dynamics in phase p converges to the steady
state
z(p) = (I−W)−1(w0 ◦ z(p−1) +wg(p) ◦ x(p) −wb(p) ◦ y(p)) (3)
2.3. Formulation of Two-Phase Objective Function
We now derive the objective function
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i , the sum of opinion values
of all the nodes at the end of the second phase. Premultiplying Equation (3) by
1T gives
1T z(p) = 1T (I−W)−1(w0 ◦ z(p−1) +wg ◦ x(p) −wb ◦ y(p))
Let ∆ = (I−W)−1 and rT = 1T (I−W)−1, that is, ri =
∑
j∈V ∆ji. Since ∆ =∑∞
η=0 W
η, we have that ∆ji is the influence that j receives from i through walks
of all possible lengths. So ri =
∑
j∈V ∆ji can be viewed as overall influencing
power of i. Substituting these in the above equation, we get
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∑
i∈V
z
(p)
i =
∑
i∈V
ri(w
0
iiz
(p−1)
i + wigx
(p)
i − wiby(p)i )
When p = 1, this is the sum of opinions at the end of the first phase:
∑
i∈V
z
(1)
i =
∑
i∈V
ri(w
0
iiz
0
i + w
(1)
ig x
(1)
i − w(1)ib y(1)i ) (4)
Similarly, when p = 2, the sum of opinion values at the end of the second phase
is (by also using Equations (1)):
∑
j∈V
z
(2)
j =
∑
j∈V
rj(w
0
jjz
(1)
j + w
(2)
jg x
(2)
j − w(2)jb y(2)j )
=
∑
j∈V
rj
(
w0jjz
(1)
j +
θj
2
(1 + w0jjz
(1)
j )x
(2)
j −
θj
2
(1− w0jjz(1)j )y(2)j
)
=
∑
j∈V
rjw
0
jjz
(1)
j
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j +
θj
2
y
(2)
j
)
+
∑
j∈V
rj
θj
2
(x
(2)
j − y(2)j ) (5)
The first term
∑
j∈V rjw
0
jjz
(1)
j
(
1 +
θj
2 x
(2)
j +
θj
2 y
(2)
j
)
can be obtained by pre-
multiplying (4) by (r ◦w0 ◦ (1+ Θ2 ◦ x(2) + Θ2 ◦ y(2)))T and using (1). Hence,
∑
j∈V
rjw
0
jjz
(1)
j
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j +
θj
2
y
(2)
j
)
=
(
r ◦w0 ◦ (1+ Θ
2
◦ x(2) + Θ
2
◦ y(2))
)T
(I−W)−1(w0 ◦ z(0) +w(1)g ◦ x(1) −w(1)b ◦ y(1))
=
∑
i∈V
(∑
j∈V
rjw
0
jj
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j +
θj
2
y
(2)
j
)
∆ji
)
(w0iiz
0
i + w
(1)
ig x
(1)
i − w(1)ib y(1)i )
=
∑
i∈V
(∑
j∈V
rjw
0
jj
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j +
θj
2
y
(2)
j
)
∆ji
)(
w0iiz
0
i +
θi
2
(1 + w0iiz
0
i )x
(1)
i −
θi
2
(1− w0iiz0i )y(1)i
)
=
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
(
w0iiz
0
i
(
1 +
θi
2
x
(1)
i +
θi
2
y
(1)
i
)
+
θi
2
(x
(1)
i − y(1)i )
)(
rjw
0
jj∆ji
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j +
θj
2
y
(2)
j
))
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Substituting this in (5), we get we get that
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i equals∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
(
w0iiz
0
i
(
1 +
θi
2
x
(1)
i +
θi
2
y
(1)
i
)
+
θi
2
(x
(1)
i − y(1)i )
)(
rjw
0
jj∆ji
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j +
θj
2
y
(2)
j
))
+
∑
j∈V
rj
θj
2
(x
(2)
j − y(2)j )
(6)
For notational simplicity, let bji = rjw
0
jj∆ji, ci = w
0
iiz
0
i . We saw that
ri =
∑
j∈V ∆ji indicates the influencing power of node i. Now, bji = ∆jiw
0
jjrj
quantifies the overall influence ∆ji of i on j, which would give weightage w
0
jj
to its initial bias in the next phase, and have an influencing power of rj in
the next phase. Hence bji can be interpreted as the influence of node i on the
network through node j, looking one phase ahead. So,
∑
j∈V bji can be viewed
as the overall influencing power of node i, looking one phase ahead. We denote
si =
∑
j∈V bji =
∑
j∈V rjw
0
jj∆ji. In matrix notation, we have s = ∆
T (r ◦w0).
We identify the role of parameter si in our analysis later.
Two-phase Katz centrality. Note that ri =
(
(I−WT )−11)
i
can be interpreted
as a form of Katz centrality [50] of node i. The original Katz centrality is
defined for an adjacency matrixA with all edges having the same weight α. Katz
centrality of node i is defined as the ith element of vector
((
I− αAT )−1− I)1 =(
I− αAT )−1 1− 1, for 0<α< 1|ρ| where ρ is the largest eigenvalue of A. In our
case where r =
(
I−WT )−1 1, A is replaced by the weighted adjacency matrix
W, for which |ρ| < 1 (since W is strictly substochastic), and we have α = 1.
The subtraction of vector 1 is common for all nodes, so its relative effect can
be ignored. Hence, ri measures node i’s relative influence in a social network
when there are is no subsequent phase to follow. In the two-phase setting,
this applies to the second phase since it is the terminal phase. However, while
selecting optimal nodes in the first phase, when there is a subsequent phase to
follow, the effectiveness of node i depends on its influencing power over those
nodes (j), which would give good weightage (w0jj) to their initial biases in the
second phase, as well as have a good influencing power over other nodes (rj) in
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the second phase. This is precisely captured by si, and so it can be viewed as
the two-phase Katz centrality.
Now, using this simplified notation, Equation (6) can be written as
∑
i∈V
z
(2)
i =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cibji +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
(∑
i∈V
cibji + rj
)
+
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
(∑
i∈V
cibji − rj
)
+
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji +
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
−
∑
i∈V
y
(1)
i
θi
2
(1− ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji +
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
(7)
2.4. The Two-phase Investment Game
Following our model, we have that (x(1),x(2)) is the strategy of the good
camp for the two phases, and (y(1),y(2)) is the strategy of the bad camp. Given
an investment strategy profile
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
, let ug
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
be the good camp’s utility and ub
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
be the bad camp’s
utility. The good camp aims to maximize the value of (7), while the bad camp
aims to minimize it. So,
ug
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
=
∑
i∈V
z
(2)
i
and ub
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
= −
∑
i∈V
z
(2)
i (8)
with the following constraints on the investment strategies:
∑
i∈V
(
x
(1)
i + x
(2)
i
) ≤ kg , ∑
i∈V
(
y
(1)
i + y
(2)
i
) ≤ kb
∀i ∈ V : x(1)i , x(2)i , y(1)i , y(2)i ≥ 0
The game can thus be viewed as a two-player zero-sum game, where the players
determine their investment strategies (x(1),x(2)) and (y(1),y(2)); the good camp
invests as per x(1) in the first phase and as per x(2) in the second phase, and
the bad camp invests as per y(1) in the first phase and as per y(2) in the second
phase. Our objective essentially is to find the Nash equilibrium strategies of the
two camps.
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First, we consider a simplified yet interesting (and not-yet-studied-in-literature)
case where budget of one of the camps is 0 (say kb = 0); so effectively we have
only the good camp.
3. The Non-Competitive Case
For the non-competitive case, when there is only one camp (say the good
camp, without loss of analytical generality), we have y
(1)
i = y
(2)
i = 0,∀i ∈ V in
Equation (7). So we get
∑
i∈V
z
(2)
i =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cibji +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
(∑
i∈V
cibji + rj
)
+
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
=
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cibji +
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
(∑
i∈V
cibji + rj
)
+
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji (9)
=
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
+ (terms independent of x
(1)
i ) (10)
=
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
(
rj +
∑
i∈V
cibji +
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)bji
)
+ (terms independent of x
(2)
j )
(11)
Deducing from Equations (10) and (11) that
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i is a bilinear function in
x(1) and x(2), we prove our next result.
Let the budget kg be split such that k
(1)
g and k
(2)
g are the first and second
phase investments, respectively. Our method of finding optimal k
(1)
g and k
(2)
g is
to first search for them in the search space k
(1)
g +k
(2)
g ∈ (0, kg] and then compare
the thus obtained value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i with that corresponding to k
(1)
g = k
(2)
g = 0,
so as to get the optimal value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i .
Proposition 1. In the search space k
(1)
g + k
(2)
g ∈ (0, kg], it is optimal for the
good camp to exhaust its entire budget (k
(1)
g + k
(2)
g = kg), and to invest on at
most one node in each phase.
Proof. Given any x(2), Expression (10) can be maximized w.r.t. x(1) by allocat-
ing kg−
∑
j∈V x
(2)
j to a single node i that maximizes
θi
2 (1+ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V x
(2)
j
θj
2 bji
)
,
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if this value is positive. In case of multiple such nodes, one node can be cho-
sen at random. If this value is non-positive for all nodes, it is optimal to have
x(1) = 0. When x(1) = 0, Expression (11) now implies that it is optimal to
allocate the entire budget kg in second phase to a single node j that maximizes
θj
2
(
rj +
∑
i∈V cibji
)
, if this value is positive. If this value is non-positive for all
nodes, it is optimal to have x(2) = 0. This is the case where starting with an
x(2), we conclude that it is optimal to either invest kg −
∑
j∈V x
(2)
j on a single
node in first phase, or invest the entire budget kg on a single node in second
phase, or invest in neither phase.
Similarly using (11), starting with an x(1), we can conclude that it is optimal
to either invest kg −
∑
j∈V x
(1)
j on a single node in the second phase, or invest
the entire kg on a single node in the first phase, or invest in neither phase.
So starting from any x(1) or x(2), we can iteratively improve (need not be
strictly) on the value of (9) by investing on at most one node in a given phase.
Furthermore, it is suboptimal to have k
(1)
g + k
(2)
g < kg unless k
(1)
g = k
(2)
g = 0.
Note that, in case of multiple nodes maximizing the respective coefficients
(for instance, θi2 (1 + ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V x
(2)
j
θj
2 bji
)
while determining optimal x(1))
we mentioned that one such node can be chosen at random. So, there may be
optimal strategies in which the camp could invest on multiple nodes in a phase.
However, since investing on one node per phase suffices to achieve the optimum,
it is an optimal strategy (not the only optimal strategy) to invest on at most
one node in each phase.
Following Proposition 1, there exist optimal vectors x(1) and x(2) that max-
imize (9), such that x
(1)
α = k
(1)
g , x
(2)
β = k
(2)
g , x
(1)
i6=α = x
(2)
j 6=β = 0. Now the next
step is to find nodes α and β that maximize (9). By incorporating α and β in
(9), we have
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i equals
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cibji + k
(1)
g
θα
2
(1 + cα)sα + k
(2)
g
θβ
2
(∑
i∈V
cibβi + rβ
)
+ k(1)g k
(2)
g
θαθβ
4
(1 + cα)bβα (12)
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Now, for a given pair (α, β), we will find the optimal values of k
(1)
g and
k
(2)
g from (12). From Proposition 1, we first consider k
(2)
g = kg − k(1)g . So the
expression to be maximized is
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cibji + k
(1)
g
θα
2
(1 + cα)sα + (kg − k(1)g )θβ
2
(∑
i∈V
cibβi + rβ
)
+ k(1)g (kg − k(1)g )θαθβ
4
(1 + cα)bβα
Equating its first derivative w.r.t. k
(1)
g to zero, we get the candidate k
(1)
g for
pair (α, β) to be
kg
2
+
sα
θβbβα
−
∑
i∈V bβici + rβ
θαbβα(1 + cα)
A valid value of k
(1)
g can be obtained only if the denominators in above expression
are non-zero. However, a zero denominator would mean that Expression (12)
is linear, resulting in the optimal k
(1)
g being either 0 or kg. Also, if the second
derivative with respect to k
(1)
g is positive, that is, −θαθβ(1+cα)bβα > 0, optimal
k
(1)
g is either 0 or kg. If the second derivative with respect to k
(1)
g is negative:
−θαθβ(1+cα)bβα = −θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(w0ααz0α+1) < 0, and since k(1)g is bounded
in [0, kg], optimal k
(1)
g for pair (α, β) is (since ci = w
0
iiz
0
i , bji = rjw
0
jj∆ji,
si =
∑
j∈V bji):
min
{
max
{
kg
2
+
sα
θβrβw0ββ∆βα
− 1 + w
0
ββ
∑
i∈V ∆βiw
0
iiz
0
i
θαw0ββ∆βα(1 + w
0
ααz0α)
, 0
}
, kg
}
(13)
and the corresponding optimal value of k
(2)
g for pair (α, β) is
min
{
max
{
kg
2
− sα
θβrβw0ββ∆βα
+
1 + w0ββ
∑
i∈V ∆βiw
0
iiz
0
i
θαw0ββ∆βα(1 + w
0
ααz0α)
, 0
}
, kg
}
(14)
When we assumed k
(1)
g and k
(2)
g to be fixed, we had to iterate through all
(α, β) pairs to determine the one that gives the optimal value of Expression (12).
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Now, whenever we look at an (α, β) pair, we can determine the corresponding
optimal values of k
(1)
g and k
(2)
g using (13) and (14), and hence determine the
value of Expression (12) by plugging in the optimal k
(1)
g and k
(2)
g and that (α, β)
pair. The optimal pair (α, β) can thus be obtained as the pair that maximizes
(12).
Above analysis holds when k
(1)
g + k
(2)
g = kg. From Proposition 1, we need to
consider one more possibility that k
(1)
g = k
(2)
g = 0, which gives a constant value∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V cibji for Expression (12). Let (0, 0) correspond to this additional
possibility. It is hence optimal to invest k
(1)
g (obtained using (13)) on node α
in the first phase and k
(2)
g (obtained using (14)) on node β in the second phase,
subject to it giving a value greater than
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V cibji to Expression (12).
Since we iterate through (n2 + 1) possibilities (namely, (α, β) ∈ V × V ∪
{(0, 0)}), the above procedure gives a polynomial time algorithm for determining
the optimal budget split and the optimal investments on nodes in two phases.
It can also be shown that the complexity of this algorithm is dominated by the
matrix inversion operation (computation of ∆).
Remark 1. For non-negative values of parameters, (13) indicates that for a
given (α, β) pair, the good camp would want to invest more in the first phase for
a higher sα. This is intuitive from our understanding of sα being viewed as the
influencing power of node α looking one phase ahead. Similarly, (14) indicates
that it would want to invest more in second phase for a higher rβ, since rβ can
be viewed as the influencing power of node β in the immediate phase. Also, (13)
and (14) indicate that a higher θα drives the camp to invest in first phase and a
higher θβ drives it to invest in second phase. Since wig is an increasing function
of θi, this implicitly means that a node with a higher wig drives the good camp
to invest in the phase in which that node is selected. Further, we illustrate the
role of w0ii using simulations in Section 5.
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4. The Case of Competing Camps
We now analyze the general scenario involving the two competing camps.
We first prove the following result.
Proposition 2. In the search space k
(1)
g + k
(2)
g ∈ (0, kg], it is optimal for the
good camp to have k
(1)
g + k
(2)
g = kg, and to invest on at most one node in each
phase. In the search space k
(1)
b + k
(2)
b ∈ (0, kb], it is optimal for the bad camp to
have k
(1)
b + k
(2)
b = kb, and to invest on at most one node in each phase.
Proof. We show that
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i is a multilinear function, since it can be written
as a linear function in x(1),y(1),x(2),y(2) individually, as follows:
∑
i∈V
z
(2)
i =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cibji +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
(∑
i∈V
cibji + rj
)
+
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
(∑
i∈V
cibji − rj
)
+
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji +
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
−
∑
i∈V
y
(1)
i
θi
2
(1− ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji +
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
=
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji +
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
+ (terms independent of x
(1)
i )
= −
∑
i∈V
y
(1)
i
θi
2
(1− ci)
(
si +
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji +
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
+ (terms independent of y
(1)
i )
=
∑
j∈V
x
(2)
j
θj
2
(
rj +
∑
i∈V
cibji +
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)bji −
∑
i∈V
y
(1)
i
θi
2
(1− ci)bji
)
+ (terms independent of x
(2)
j )
= −
∑
j∈V
y
(2)
j
θj
2
(
rj −
∑
i∈V
cibji −
∑
i∈V
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1 + ci)bji +
∑
i∈V
y
(1)
i
θi
2
(1− ci)bji
)
+ (terms independent of y
(2)
j )
The rest of the proof follows on similar lines as Proposition 1. (Note the
negative signs assigned to the coefficients y
(1)
i and y
(2)
j since the bad camp
computes the values of these parameters so as to minimize
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i ).
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From Proposition 2, there exist optimal vectors x(1),x(2) for good camp and
optimal vectors y(1),y(2) for bad camp, such that x
(1)
α = k
(1)
g , x
(2)
β = k
(2)
g , y
(1)
γ =
k
(1)
b , y
(2)
δ = k
(2)
b , and x
(1)
i 6=α = x
(2)
j 6=β = y
(1)
i6=γ = y
(2)
j 6=δ = 0. Assuming such profile of
nodes ((α, β), (γ, δ)), we first find ((x
(1)
α , x
(2)
β ), (y
(1)
γ , y
(2)
δ )), or equivalently, the
optimal ((k
(1)
g , k
(2)
g ), (k
(1)
b , k
(2)
b )) corresponding to such a profile. By incorporat-
ing ((α, β), (γ, δ)), Expression (7) for
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i simplifies to
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cibji + k
(2)
g
θβ
2
(∑
i∈V
cibβi + rβ
)
+ k
(2)
b
θδ
2
(∑
i∈V
cibδi − rδ
)
+ k(1)g
θα
2
(1 + cα)
(
sα + k
(2)
g
θβ
2
bβα + k
(2)
b
θδ
2
bδα
)
− k(1)b
θγ
2
(1− cγ)
(
sγ + k
(2)
g
θβ
2
bβγ + k
(2)
b
θδ
2
bδγ
)
(15)
First, we consider the case when k
(1)
g + k
(2)
g = kg and k
(1)
b + k
(2)
b = kb. Now,
for a given profile of nodes ((α, β), (γ, δ)), we will find the optimal values of
k
(1)
g , k
(2)
g , k
(1)
b , k
(2)
b . In this case, we have k
(2)
g = kg − k(1)g and k(2)b = kb − k(1)b .
Substituting this in (15) and equating
∂
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i
∂k
(1)
g
= 0, we get
−θβ
2
(∑
i∈V
cibβi + rβ
)
+
θα
2
(1 + cα)
(
sα + (kg − 2k(1)g )θβ
2
bβα + (kb − k(1)b )
θδ
2
bδα
)
+k
(1)
b
θγ
2
(1− cγ)θβ
2
bβα = 0
Let A = θγθδ(1− cγ)bδγ , D = θαθβ(1 + cα)bβα, and
B = 12 (θαθδ(1 + cα)bδα − θγθβ(1− cγ)bβγ). So, the above can be written as
Dk(1)g +Bk
(1)
b = −θβ
(∑
i∈V
cibβi + rβ
)
+ θα(1 + cα)
(
sα + kg
θβ
2
bβα + kb
θδ
2
bδα
)
(16)
Similarly, equating
∂
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i
∂k
(1)
b
= 0, we get
Bk(1)g −Ak(1)b = −θδ
(∑
i∈V
cibδi − rδ
)
− θγ(1− cγ)
(
sγ + kg
θβ
2
bβγ + kb
θδ
2
bδγ
)
(17)
Solving Equations (16) and (17) simultaneously, we obtain the candidate
k
(1)
g for profile ((α, β), (γ, δ)) to be
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1B2 +DA
[
sαθα(1 + cα)A− rβθβA− sγθγ(1− cγ)B + rδθδB
+kg
(θαθβ
2
(1 + cα)bβαA− θγθβ
2
(1− cγ)bβγB
)
+kb
(θαθδ
2
(1 + cα)bδαA− θγθδ
2
(1− cγ)bδγB
)
−θβA
∑
i∈V
cibβi − θδB
∑
i∈V
cibδi
]
We can similarly obtain the candidate k
(1)
b for profile ((α, β), (γ, δ)) to be
1
B2 +DA
[
sαθα(1 + cα)B − rβθβB + sγθγ(1− cγ)D − rδθδD
+kg
(θαθβ
2
(1 + cα)bβαB +
θγθβ
2
(1− cγ)bβγD
)
+kb
(θαθδ
2
(1 + cα)bδαB +
θγθδ
2
(1− cγ)bδγD
)
−θβB
∑
i∈V
cibβi + θδD
∑
i∈V
cibδi
]
If second derivative w.r.t. k
(1)
g , that is, −θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(1 + w0ααz0α) < 0
and that w.r.t. k
(1)
b , that is, θγθδrδw
0
δδ∆δγ(1 − w0γγz0γ) > 0, and the obtained
solution is such that k
(1)
g ∈ [0, kg] and k(1)b ∈ [0, kb], then neither the good
camp can change k
(1)
g to increase
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i , nor the bad camp can change k
(1)
b
to decrease
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i . So we can effectively write ug((x
(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2)))
as ug((α, β), (γ, δ)), where ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) is the value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i , which
corresponds to the strategy profile where good camp invests on nodes (α, β)
with optimal budget split (k
(1)
g , k
(2)
g ), and bad camp invests on nodes (γ, δ)
with optimal budget split (k
(1)
b , k
(2)
b ).
For general case where the solution k
(1)
g , k
(1)
b obtained above may not sat-
isfy k
(1)
g ∈ [0, kg] and k(1)b ∈ [0, kb], we make practically reasonable assump-
tions so as to determine ug((α, β), (γ, δ)). We assume that wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and
w0ii ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, z0i ∈ [−1, 1],∀i ∈ V . For the fund collection example, these
assumptions respectively mean that nodes do not distrust each other, they do
not weigh their own biases negatively (which is trivially true in the real world),
they attribute a non-negative weightage to being influenced due to campaign-
ing as a whole, and they are not excessively biased towards any particular camp
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before the campaigning and opinion dynamics begin. Now, it is easy to show
that if wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j), then ∆ij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and ri ≥ 1,∀i ∈ V . So if we assume
wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and w0ii ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, z0i ∈ [−1, 1],∀i ∈ V , we would have that
−θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(1 + w0ααz0α) ≤ 0 and θγθδrδw0δδ∆δγ(1 − w0γγz0γ) ≥ 0. That
is, we would have
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i to be a convex-concave function, which is concave
w.r.t. k
(1)
g and convex w.r.t. k
(1)
b . So in the domain ([0, kg], [0, kb]), we can
find a (k
(1)
g , k
(1)
b ) such that, neither the good camp can change k
(1)
g to increase∑
i∈V z
(2)
i , nor the bad camp can change k
(1)
b to decrease
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i [51, 52]. So
we can assign this value
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i to ug((α, β), (γ, δ)).
Thus using above technique, we obtain ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) for all profiles of
nodes ((α, β), (γ, δ)) when k
(1)
g + k
(2)
g = kg and k
(1)
b + k
(2)
b = kb. From Proposi-
tion 2, the only other cases to consider are k
(1)
b = k
(2)
b = 0 and k
(1)
g = k
(2)
g = 0.
Let the profile ((α, β), (0, 0)) correspond to k
(1)
b = k
(2)
b = 0. Note that when
k
(1)
b = k
(2)
b = 0, it reduces to non-competitive case with only good camp (Sec-
tion 3); the value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i for an (α, β) pair can hence be assigned to
ug((α, β), (0, 0)). Thus we can obtain ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) for all profiles of nodes
((α, β), (0, 0)). Similarly, we can obtain ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) for all profiles of nodes
((0, 0), (γ, δ)). And from Equation (15), ug((0, 0), (0, 0)) =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V cibji.
So we have that the good camp has (n2+1) possible pure strategies to choose
from, namely, (α, β) ∈ V × V ∪ {(0, 0)}. Similarly, the bad camp has (n2 + 1)
possible pure strategies to choose from, namely, (γ, δ) ∈ V × V ∪ {(0, 0)}. We
thus have a two-player zero-sum game, for which the utilities of the players
can be computed for each strategy profile ((α, β), (γ, δ)) as explained above.
Though we cannot ensure the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the
finiteness of the number of strategies ensures the existence of a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium. Further, owing to it being a two-player zero-sum game, the
Nash equilibrium can be found efficiently by solving a linear program [53].
Summarizing, under practically reasonable assumptions (wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and
w0ii ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, z0i ∈ [−1, 1],∀i ∈ V ), we transformed the problem into a two-
player zero-sum game with each player having (n2 + 1) pure strategies, and
showed how the players’ utilities can be computed for each strategy profile.
24
We thus deduced the existence of Nash equilibrium and that it can be found
efficiently using linear programming.
5. Simulations and Results
For determining implications of our analytical results on real-world network
datasets, we conducted simulations on NetHEPT dataset (an academic collab-
oration network obtained from co-authorships in the “High Energy Physics -
Theory” papers published on the e-print arXiv from 1991 to 2003) consisting of
15,233 nodes and 31,376 edges. It is widely used for experimental justifications
in the literature on opinion adoption [11, 54, 55]. For the purpose of graphical
illustration as well as running the computationally intensive algorithm for deter-
mining Nash equilibrium for the case of competing camps, we use the popular
Zachary’s Karate club dataset consisting of 34 nodes and 78 edges [56]. In all
of our simulations, we assume the value of w0ii to be the same for all nodes, in
order to systematically study the effect of this value.
While our model of opinion dynamics (which is an extension of Friedkin-
Johnsen model) is based on an iterative process using its update rule, we
have arrived at closed form expressions for computing z(1) and z(2), and hence∑
i∈V z
(1)
i and
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i . So instead of running the opinion dynamics until
convergence for arriving at their converged values, we compute the values of the
corresponding closed form expressions. Our approaches for finding the nodes
to be invested on in the two phases, in both the non-competitive and compet-
itive cases, involve iterating over node tuples for computing the corresponding
budget splits and the value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i . Hence, our algorithms have adequate
scope for parallel computing. We implemented it using MATLAB and ran on
an 8-threaded Intel Core i7 2.8 GHz processor. For given values of v0i and w
0
ii,
the running time of our algorithm for the NetHEPT dataset (non-competitive
case) was around 3 hours. For the Karate dataset, the running time for the
non-competitive case was less than 0.1 seconds, while that for the competitive
case was around 1 minute.
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5.1. Simulation Results: The Non-Competitive (Single Camp) Case
For the single camp case, we consider z0i = 0,∀i ∈ V (unless specified other-
wise) to start with a neutral network. This would help us to reliably study the
effects of critical parameters w0ii, ri, and hence also sj . Note that z
0
i = 0,∀i ∈ V
would mean that w
(1)
ig = w
(1)
ib (from (1)), that is, we start with an unbiased
population.
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Figure 1: The effect of different budget splits on the good camp’s utility (NetHEPT) with
kg = 100 for w0ii = 0.5,∀i ∈ V (z0i = 0,∀i ∈ V )
Figure 1 shows how the good camp’s utility
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i changes as it increases
the budget allotment for the first phase (while decreasing the budget allotment
for the second phase) for NetHEPT dataset with kg = 100 for w
0
ii = 0.5,∀i ∈ V .
A natural tradeoff is observed in the plot since investing heavily in either phase
results in a low utility; the optimal budget allocation for the first phase is thus
an intermediate value. The tradeoff arises since a lower investment in the first
phase results in worse initial biases for the second phase in the network, thus
resulting a poorer opinion values to start with in the second phase, and also
lower effectiveness of its investment in the second phase. On the other hand, a
higher investment in the first phase spares a lower available budget for second
phase, resulting in the camp being unable to fully harness the influenced biases.
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Figure 2: The effect of w0ii (NetHEPT) with kg = 100 (z
0
i = 0, ∀i ∈ V )
5.1.1. The effect of w0ii
Figure 2 presents the optimal budget that should be allotted for the first
phase as a function of w0ii. In our simulations, the optimal values obtained are
such that k
(2)
g = kg − k(1)g . For low values of w0ii, the optimal strategy is to
invest almost entirely in the second phase. This is because the effect of the first
phase diminishes in the second phase when w0ii is low. Remark 1 states that a
high sj value (influencing power of j looking one phase ahead) would attract
high investment in the first phase. The value sj =
∑
i∈V riw
0
ii∆ij would be
significant only if j influences nodes i with significant values of w0ii. With low
w0ii, we are less likely to have node j with high value of sj since it requires it
to be influential towards significant number of nodes i with significant values
of w0ii. Hence, allotting a significant budget for the first phase is advantageous
only if we have nodes with significant value of w0ii.
5.1.2. The effect of z0i
To supplement the above observation, we observed the effects of z0i 6= 0
(initially biased network). These plots did not differ noticeably from the one
in Figure 2, even for higher magnitudes of z0i . There are subtle differences,
however. If z0i ’s are positive, the good camp invests less in the first phase. This
is because z0i ’s already give a head start for a healthy value at the end of the
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first phase (which is bias for the second phase), and so the budget could rather
be invested in the second phase. On the other hand, if z0i ’s are negative, it
invests more in the first phase so as to nullify the initial disadvantage.
5.1.3. The effect of camp being myopic
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Figure 3: The effect of using myopic investment strategy for different values of w0ii (NetHEPT)
with kg = 100 (z0i = 0, ∀i ∈ V )
We generally consider that the camp is farsighted , that is, it computes its
strategy considering that there would be a second phase, that is, it considers the
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objective function
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i . A camp can be called myopic if it computes its
strategy greedily by considering the near-sighted objective function
∑
i∈V z
(1)
i .
In other words, when the camp is myopic, it perceives its utility as
∑
i∈V z
(1)
i
and devises its strategy to invest greedily in the first phase, even though its
actual utility is
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i .
Figure 3 shows the effect of the good camp using myopic strategy (invest-
ing the entire budget in the first phase) over the wide range of w0ii values for
NetHEPT dataset with kg = 100. It is clear that the myopic strategy would
result in a higher value of
∑
i∈V z
(1)
i than that achieved using the farsighted
strategy, since the myopic one invests the entire budget in the first phase, while
the farsighted one invests as per Figure 2. This can be seen from Figure 3(a).
In Figure 3(b), when w0ii = 0, the myopic strategy results in zero utility as it
invests its entire budget in the first phase (which plays no role when w0ii = 0),
while the farsighted strategy suggests the camp to invest its entire budget in
the second phase (which is why it results in
∑
i∈V z
(1)
i = 0 when w
0
ii = 0 in
Figure 3(a)). Figure 3(b) also suggests that the loss incurred by playing myopic
strategy could be considerably high for high values of w0ii. This emphasizes that,
though high w0ii’s are suitable for high investments in the first phase so as to
influence the biases for the second phase (as seen in Figure 2), it is important to
spare a certain fraction of the budget so as to be invested in the second phase
in order to harness the influenced biases.
5.1.4. Phasewise progression of opinion values
In order to illustrate the phasewise progression of opinion values of nodes,
we use the small-sized Zachary’s Karate club dataset for visualization. Figure 4
shows the computed values of si and ri for the nodes in the dataset. The size and
color saturation of a node i represent the value of the corresponding parameter
(bigger size and higher saturation implies higher value). For this dataset, the
investment was made on a single node common to both the phases. This node
visibly stands out in Figures 5 and 6 with its size and color saturation; we refer
to this as the prime node in our discussion.
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(a) values of si (b) values of ri
Figure 4: Nodes’ relative values of si and ri
(a) at the end of first phase (b) at the end of second phase
Figure 5: Illustration of phasewise progression of opinion values when w0ii = 0.5 (Karate)
with kg = 5 (z0i = 0,∀i ∈ V )
(a) at the end of first phase (b) at the end of second phase
Figure 6: Illustration of phasewise progression of opinion values when w0ii = 0.9 (Karate)
with kg = 5 (z0i = 0,∀i ∈ V )
In Figures 5 and 6, the size and color saturation of a node i represent its
opinion value (bigger size and higher saturation implies higher opinion value).
It can be seen that a higher value of w0ii results in a significant change in opin-
ion values in the second phase. This is owing to the fact that the good camp’s
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investment is more effective in the second phase when nodes attribute higher
weightage to their initial biases in the second phase, or equivalently, their opin-
ions at the end of the first phase (Equation (1)) (assuming positive opinion
values which is the case here).
5.1.5. Other Possible Approaches
Since our approach requires n2 iterations so as to search over all pairs of
nodes, we explore other possible approaches which could be used for determining
a way of splitting the total available budget across the two phases as well as the
nodes to be invested on in the two phases.
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Figure 7: Histogram showing the number of node pairs resulting in different values of∑
i∈V z
(2)
i for w
0
ii = 0.5 for NetHEPT dataset with kg = 100 (z
0
i = 0,∀i ∈ V )
We first study how a random algorithm would perform. In particular, we
study the distribution of the values of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i over all pairs of nodes, assuming
that the budget split for a given pair is obtained using Expressions (13) and
(14). Figure 7 shows the histogram for the NetHEPT dataset with kg = 100,
considering w0ii = 0.5 (the histograms for other values of w
0
ii were qualitatively
similar). While the value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i corresponding to the optimal node pair
is 666.02, it can be seen that most pairs resulted in value less than 100. Hence,
it is clear that a random node selection algorithm would perform quite badly,
even with our approach of optimally splitting the budget across the two phases.
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Figure 8: Performance of high degree heuristic with different budget splits versus the optimal
algorithm (NetHEPT) with kg = 100 (z0i = 0, ∀i ∈ V )
However, instead of selecting nodes randomly, certain node centrality mea-
sures could be used in order to find the important nodes which can be invested
on. The budget could be split over the two phases, either in a manually chosen
ratio, or using Expressions (13) and (14) corresponding to the chosen nodes.
Figure 8 presents the results of the high degree heuristic, where the highest de-
gree node is chosen to be invested on in both the phases. The different ways of
splitting the budget are, hence, compared with our optimal approach. A 25:75
split (k
(1)
g = 25, k
(2)
g = 75) performs well for low values of w0ii, since as explained
earlier, a low w0ii necessitates a higher investment in the second phase. On the
other hand, a 50:50 split performs well for moderate and high values of w0ii,
since the optimal budget split for this node pair obtained using (13) and (14)
was close to 50:50. For the same reason, the difference in the performances of
the 50:50 split and the optimal split is not very significant.
While the node selection approaches based on node centrality measures are
likely to perform well in practice, we explore another greedy approach which
explicitly accounts for our objective function (12) while selecting the nodes
in the two phases. Specifically, while choosing the node for the first phase,
we ignore any investment that would occur in the second phase. That is, in
Expression (12), we assume k
(2)
g = 0. So the node to be chosen for the first
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phase is the node α with the highest value of θα(1 + cα)sα. Now assuming this
node as the one that would be invested on in the first phase, we iterate over the
n nodes to be invested on in the second phase (while determining the budget
split as per (13) and (14)), so that the value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i is maximized. For
the studied NetHEPT dataset, the nodes chosen for the two phases using this
greedy approach turn out to be the highest degree node. Hence, this approach
performs equal to the high degree heuristic with the optimal split (Figure 8) for
the NetHEPT dataset. However, in general, the greedy approach is a promising
one, since it partially accounts for the objective function, while reducing the
number of iterations from n2 to 2n.
5.2. Simulation Results: The Case of Competing Camps
Though we presented a polynomial time algorithm for determining Nash
equilibrium when there are two camps, which is of theoretical interest, it is
computationally expensive to run it on larger networks. Hence, for the purpose
of studying the case of competing camps, we consider the Zachary’s Karate club
dataset (34 nodes, 78 edges) [56].
Note that for z0i = 0, the two-phase investment game turns out to be sym-
metric, since both camps would have the same effectiveness in the first phase,
that is, w
(1)
ig = w
(1)
ib ,∀i ∈ V . The other parameters such as wij and w0ii, and
hence si and ri, are common to both the camps. So, the Nash equilibrium
strategy played by the camps is symmetric. Owing to the game being zero-sum,
this results in both camps receiving zero utility, that is,
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i = 0.
5.2.1. The effect of w0ii
Since z0i = 0 results in trivial observations, we study the effect of w
0
ii, while
first considering z0i = +0.1. In general, we observed that high values of w
0
ii
resulted in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which the camps invested their
entire budget on the prime node mentioned in Section 5.1.4. For low and inter-
mediate values of w0ii, we computed mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, describing
the probability with which the good camp would invest on the pair (α, β) (node
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α in the first phase and node β in the second phase) and the probability with
which the bad camp would invest on the pair (γ, δ), with the corresponding
saddle point budget splits as derived in Section 4. Hence, in order to study the
budget allotted to the first phase for a given value of w0ii, we compute the expec-
tation (weighted average where the weights correspond to the probabilities) of
the first phase investments corresponding to the aforementioned pairs of nodes.
Formally, in mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, let the good camp play its
strategy (α, β) with probability Pg(α, β) and the bad camp play (γ, δ) with prob-
ability Pb(γ, δ). Let the corresponding saddle point suggest the good camp to in-
vest k
(1)
g ((α, β), (γ, δ)) on node α, and the bad camp to invest k
(1)
b ((α, β), (γ, δ))
on node γ, in the first phase. So the expected (weighted average) first phase in-
vestment by the good camp is
∑
((α,β),(γ,δ)) Pg(α, β) ·Pb(γ, δ) ·k(1)g ((α, β), (γ, δ))
and that by the bad camp is
∑
((α,β),(γ,δ)) Pg(α, β) · Pb(γ, δ) · k(1)b ((α, β), (γ, δ)).
For various values of w0ii in general, the camps invested significantly on the
prime node (mentioned in Section 5.1.4) with high probability. Investments were
also made with considerable probability on the node with the highest value of
si in the first phase and the second highest value of ri in the second phase,
in Figure 4. Certain other nodes with good enough values of si and ri were
invested on with low non-zero probabilities.
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Figure 9: The effect of w0ii (Karate) with kg = kb = 5 (z
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i = +0.1, ∀i ∈ V )
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Figure 9 presents the weighted average (expected) investments in the first
phase by the two camps in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, corresponding
to different values of w0ii. Similar to the single camp case, the trend is similar
in that, the budget allotted to the first phase increases with w0ii. A high w
0
ii
encourages the camps to influence the initial biases for the second phase, which
not only plays a key role in determining the final opinion owing to the high
weightage attributed to the biases in the second phase (which are same as the
opinions at the end of the first phase), but also enhances the effectiveness of the
camps’ investments in the second phase.
5.2.2. The effect of z0i
Recall from Section 4 that ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) is the good camp’s utility when
it plays the pure strategy (α, β) and the bad camp plays (γ, δ) with the cor-
responding saddle point budget splits. Following our above discussion on the
probabilities in mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i , quanti-
fying the expected utility of the good camp in mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,
is
∑
((α,β),(γ,δ)) Pg(α, β) · Pb(γ, δ) · ug((α, β), (γ, δ)).
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Figures 10 and 11 present the effect of z0i in conjunction with w
0
ii, on the
value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i . We observed that a higher value of initial bias in the first
phase (z0i ) results in a better utility for the good camp (and hence worse utility
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Figure 11: The effect of z0i for different values of w
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for the bad camp). This is not only because of a head start offered to the good
camp, but also because of its investment being more effective. This is further
magnified for higher w0ii, that is, if nodes attribute higher weightage to their
biases (similar to Section 5.1.4 where a higher w0ii results in a more significant
change in opinion values).
It is also noteworthy to see that, if we change the sign of z0i without changing
its magnitude, the value of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i also changes its sign while maintaining its
magnitude. This is owing to the fact that, changing the sign of z0i interchanges
the two camps’ roles, that is, the values of w
(1)
ig and w
(1)
ib (the effectiveness of
their investments in the first phase) get interchanged (while other parameters
such as wij and w
0
ii are common to both camps).
5.2.3. The effect of a camp deviating from Nash equilibrium strategy
We study the loss incurred by a camp if it deviates from its Nash equilib-
rium strategy, to: (a) a myopic strategy (investing by perceiving its utility as∑
i∈V z
(1)
i ), or (b) the farsighted single camp strategy (investing by perceiving
its utility as
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i but ignoring the presence of the competing camp). In our
simulations, we consider the good camp deviating from its equilibrium strategy
(while the bad camp played its equilibrium strategy).
Note that if the good camp decides to play myopic strategy, it perceives
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Figure 12: The effect of the good camp deviating from its Nash equilibrium strategy for
Karate dataset with kg = kb = 5 (z
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its utility as per Equation (4), where its optimal strategy is independent of the
strategy played by the bad camp. In Figure 12, we observe that the loss incurred
by playing myopic strategy is significant for low values of w0ii, in which range, it
is actually optimal to invest most of the budget in the second phase. There is no
loss incurred for high values of w0ii, since in this range, its equilibrium strategy
is to invest the entire budget in the first phase (Figure 9), which also coincides
with the myopic strategy (the nodes selected for investing on in both strategies
are the same for high w0ii).
The loss incurred by playing the single camp farsighted strategy is observed
to be relatively insignificant (the values of
∑
i∈V z
(2)
i corresponding to it almost
coincide with the equilibrium values in Figure 12). However, it is likely to be
a property of the small-sized Karate club network, rather than a generalizable
observation. It would be interesting to conduct a study on larger networks, for
which more efficient algorithms need to be developed to find Nash equilibrium.
6. Conclusion
Using Friedkin-Johnsen model of opinion dynamics, we proposed a frame-
work for two-phase investment on nodes in a social network, where a node’s final
opinion in the first phase acts as its bias in the second phase, and the effective-
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ness of a camp’s investment on that node in the second phase depends on this
bias. We formulated a two-phase investment game, where the camps’ utilities
involved a parameter which can be interpreted as two-phase Katz centrality.
For the case when there is one investing camp, we derived polynomial time
algorithm for determining an optimal way to split the budget between the two
phases. We observed a natural tradeoff, since a lower investment in the first
phase results in worse initial biases for the second phase, while a higher invest-
ment in the first phase spares a lower available budget for the second phase.
Our simulations quantified the impact of the weightage that nodes attribute to
their biases. A high weightage necessitated high investment in the first phase,
so as to effectively influence the biases to be harnessed in the second phase. We
also showed the loss incurred by a camp when it uses a myopic strategy instead
of the derived optimal one, thus highlighting the importance of an optimal bud-
get split. We also illustrated the phasewise progression of opinion values, and
hence observed the significant change in opinion values in the second phase when
nodes attribute high weightage to their biases. In order to circumvent iterating
over all pairs of nodes for finding an optimal solution, we studied other possible
approaches and compared their performance with our optimal approach.
For the case when there are two competing camps, we showed existence
of Nash equilibrium and its polynomial time computability under reasonable
assumptions (wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and w0ii ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, z0i ∈ [−1, 1],∀i ∈ V ). Using
simulations, we computed the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium investments of
the camps, and hence observed the expectation of the first phase investments
with respect to the weightage attributed by nodes to their biases. A similar
trend was seen as the single camp case, that a high weightage necessitates high
investment in the first phase. We also observed that a higher value of initial bias
in the first phase results in a better utility for the good camp (and hence worse
utility for the bad camp), not only because of a head start but also because of
its investment being more effective. This is further magnified if nodes attribute
higher weightage to their biases. We concluded by showing the loss incurred by
a camp if it deviated from its Nash equilibrium strategy.
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Future Work
This work has several interesting directions for future work, of which we
mention a few. It would be interesting to study the problem with bounds
on investment on each node by the two camps (such as ∀i ∈ V, xi + yi ≤
1). It is worth exploring whether there exist more efficient algorithms which
can circumvent iterating over all pairs of nodes, while giving an approximation
guarantee to the optimal solution and Nash equilibrium derived in this paper.
This would enable a more extensive study on larger datasets and see if any
possible additional insights could be obtained. For the competitive case, it would
also be interesting to analyze solution concepts other than Nash equilibrium,
such as correlated equilibrium.
The two-phase study can be generalized to multiple phases to see if any
additional insights or benefits can be obtained. We studied such a problem in
our another work [47], in which we assumed a camp’s influence on a node to be
independent of the node’s bias. However, with this assumption relaxed in our
current work, the analysis for more than two phases complicates considerably.
This work could act as the foundation for a generalized study.
This paper studied a setting where the two camps were represented by pos-
itive and negative opinions values. However, in general, we would need to have
the camps hold opinions in a multidimensional plane rather than on the real
number line (e.g., [57]), especially when there are more than two camps. We
explain one way in which this could be done. Let each camp (say h) have a
vector associated with its opinion (say ~vh). Let its investment on node i be
denoted by qhi and the weightage attributed by i to the camp’s opinion be wih.
One would need to derive the expression for the vector-sum of nodes’ opinions
at the end of the second phase,
∑
i∈V ~z
(2)
i . A camp’s objective would be to
drive this vector-sum towards the direction of its own opinion vector, that is, to
maximize the inner product between the vector-sum of nodes’ opinions and its
own opinion vector (that is, ~vh ·
∑
i∈V ~z
(2)
i ). Our paper can be seen as studying
the special case where we have two camps: h = g, b with ~vg = +1, ~vb = −1 and
qgi = xi, qbi = yi.
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This paper considered Friedkin-Johnsen model of opinion dynamics, since it
accounts for nodes’ biases which are fundamental to the studied problem (as
they are responsible for the change in weightage attributed to the camps). So,
in principle, the studied problem can be extended to any model which accounts
for nodes’ biases in the process of opinion dynamics. While the linearity of
Friedkin-Johnsen model enabled us to arrive at closed form expressions and
analytically derive the solutions, it would be worth investigating if the analysis
is tractable when considering other such models. This work studied a setting
where the camps could tune their investments at the end of the first phase, that
is, after the opinion dynamics reaches convergence. However, the two-phase
setting can be extended to a dynamical system by allowing camps to tune their
investments in each iteration of the opinion dynamics process, and the total
amount invested depends on the time for which the investment is made.
Personalized PageRank [58, 59] is likely to be of interest while relating it to
external camp weights, since these weight vectors (wg and wb) are personalized
according to the camps. Also, Dynamic PageRank [24] could be related to the
changing external camp weights over different phases. It is worth exploring
if efficient and effective heuristics can be developed along these lines. In our
study, we considered that the weightage attributed by a node to a camp changes
depending on how aligned the node’s bias is towards the camp. One could
also consider that the weightage attributed by a node to its neighbor changes
depending on how aligned its bias is towards its neighbor’s opinion. We did
not consider this since the weights between nodes stabilize after developing over
months and years of interactions, while the camps are relatively strangers to
the nodes and the weightage attributed to them are seldom stable. However,
in case of such a study which considers graphs and weights that change over
time, it would be useful to define dynamic two-phase Katz centrality (on similar
lines as we defined two-phase Katz centrality and taking cue from dynamic Katz
centrality [23]) for determining the importance of the individual nodes in opinion
dynamics in the different phases.
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